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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B. COVINGTON, J
by and through its Co-Personal
Representatives, Robert H.
])
Covington and Mary C. Whetman,

REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS

Plaintiffs and Appellees,
vs.
>
JOHN C. JOSEPHSON and GERALDINE C.
)
JOSEPHSON,
;
Defendants and Appellants. ]

Case No. 930371CA
Priority (15)

Defendants and appellants submit the following reply to
the Brief of Appellees:
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE PLAINTIFFS' ACTION IS BARRED BY THE

DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA OR COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL.
This subject is discussed in Point I of the Brief of
Appellants and in Points II, III and IV of Appellees' Brief.
Plaintiffs and Appellees (hereafter "plaintiffs") do not
dispute the fact, nor indeed can they, that the District Court
expressly found in Finding of Fact No. 6 in the District Court
action

(hereafter "First Case") that the subject Uniform Real

Estate Contract had been "paid in full." Having been paid in full,
there is nothing further owing under it. Defendants and Appellants
(hereafter "defendants") respectfully submit that that issue can
never be litigated again.

Had the District Court said that the

said contract was only paid up to a certain date, then plaintiffs
might be free to allege, as they now attempt to do, that something
further became due and owing thereunder at a later date.
Furthermore, when the court in the First Case quieted
title to the right-of-way in defendants, it made a determination
that the contract was paid in full (even if there had not been a
finding in paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact) because the
defendants were not entitled to have title quieted in them in the
right-of-way or any other portion of the property until they had
paid the contract in full, including principal, interest, taxes,
water assessments and any other amounts whatever.
The plaintiffs

attempt to circumvent

the

foregoing

inescapable conclusion by arguing that they hadn't yet paid said
alleged back taxes for the years 1989, '90 and '91, and that
therefore nothing was owing to them yet. Plaintiffs state at page
18 of their brief:
"Similarly, in the present case the District Court's
statement that the contract had been 'paid in full' did
not speak to obligations of the Josephsons that had not
yet arisen nor entitled them to avoid these obligations
when they matured."
Since the issue of the balance owing under the said
contract was tried

and adjudicated

in the First

Case, this

precludes any further inquiry into any amounts owing under the
contract by reason of the doctrines of res judicata or collateral
estoppel, at least unless and until that Judgment is set aside
under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Even if the issue of taxes had not been tried, it could
have been tried, and is therefore barred in any event under the
said doctrines in accordance with the decision of our Supreme Court
in Schaer v. State by & Through Dept. of Transportation. 657 P2d
1337 (Utah 1983) , which we cite in our original brief.

In that

case the court stated at page 1340: ". . . and this precludes the
relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as well
as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior action . . ."
Plaintiffs claim that they could not have made a claim
for the said taxes in the First Case because they had not yet paid
them as of the time the said Judgment was entered.

That position

is totally erroneous.

The Uniform Real Estate Contracts provides

at paragraph 12 that:

"The Buyer agrees to pay the general taxes

after 5-4-73."
And

the said contract provides

in paragraph

14 as

follows:
"In the event the Buyer shall default in the payment
of any special or general taxes, assessments or insurance
premiums as herein provided, the Seller may, at his
option, pay said taxes, assessments and insurance
premiums or either of them, and if Seller elects so to
do, then the Buyer agrees to repay the Seller upon
demand, all such sums so advanced and paid by him,
together with interest thereon from date of payment of
said sums at the rate of 3/4 of one percent per month
until paid."
It is clear therefore that plaintiffs had no obligation
to pay the taxes, but were entitled to do so if they desired.
However that may be, plaintiffs were entitled to force defendants
-3-

to pay the taxes and assessments by proceeding under the provisions
of paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, if in fact any
taxes or assessments were due and owing at the time of the District
Court Judgment.

Certainly, if taxes and assessments were owing,

plaintiffs could have proved at trial such fact of nonpayment,
which if believed by the court would have precluded the court from
quieting the title in defendants, because payment in full of the
contract is a condition precedent to conveyance of the property
from seller to buyer under paragraph 19 of the Uniform Real Estate
Contract.

Plaintiffs do not have to pay the taxes and assessments

to assert nonpayment thereof as a good defense to defendants7 right
to have title quieted in defendants.
The amount of arrears of taxes and assessments, if any,
was subject to being proved in the First Case, including interest
and penalties, and the court could have apportioned such taxes (if
there were any) between the parties.

Plaintiffs could then have

been afforded complete relief in the First Case for any unpaid
taxes and assessments by refusal of the District Court to quiet
title, or by ordering the Josephsons to pay the required amount of
taxes to the plaintiffs or to the county directly as ci condition to
quieting title in them or, as noted above, the court could have
allowed plaintiffs to foreclose under the aforesaid paragraph 16
for breach of contract.
But in either event, nonpayment of taxes and assessments
was fully assertable by plaintiffs in the First Case as a complete
-4-

bar to the relief sought by defendants in that case.

To claim

nonpayment of the taxes by plaintiffs as an excuse for losing on
that issue in the First Case, or even as an excuse for not raising
the issue in the First Case, is totally without merit.
Plaintiffs state at page 13 of their brief that:
"The Covingtons did not dispute the Josephsons/
claim that they had paid all amounts owed to the
Covingtons under the contract and had no claim against
the Josephsons until they were forced to pay the taxes
and assessments in order to sell their remaining
property."
It appears that this admission settles the matter. Even
if the plaintiffs believed that they did not have a claim against
the Josephsons for back taxes and assessments until plaintiffs
actually paid the alleged taxes, that does not help them because
that is not the law, and their mistake as to the law does not bar
the application of the doctrines of res judicata or collateral
estoppel.
The plaintiffs also cite the case of Schaer v. State By
and Through Department of Transportationf supra, because the court
in that case stated that the findings "did not purport to rule
conclusively on the status of the Dugway road 'for all time.'"
In the instant case, however, when the District Court
made a ruling that the contract was "paid in full," the court
clearly intended to make a determination that the contract was paid
in full for all time.
doctrine.

Otherwise, res judicata is a useless

If the contract has not been paid, the defendants were
-5-

not entitled to conveyance. If the defendants got a conveyance, it
was because they paid the contract.
Plaintiffs also cite Macintosh v. Hampshire. 832 P2d 1298
(Utah App. 1992) . In that case the first trial involved an action
for slander of title caused by notice of interest that had been
filed against the property by Macintosh. Macintosh counterclaimed,
asserting that he had 10% interest in the land due to an oral
agreement. In the second trial Macintosh no longer claimed that he
had an interest in the property, but alleged that he had monetary
compensation coming, which is a totally different claim.

No such

distinction exists in this case, however, and Macintosh has no
relevance here.

The Uniform Real Estate Contract is not "paid in

full" until all sums—principal, interest, taxes and assessments—
have been paid.

Plaintiffs' claim for any taxes or assessments is

necessarily encompassed in any determination that the contract is
"paid in full."
Likewise, the case of Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. , 635
P2d 417 (Utah 1981), cited by plaintiffs, is inapplicable to this
case because the second case there involved a matter which was
clearly not even touched upon in the first action.

The first

action involved lost wages, and the second case involved the issue
of disability, not lost wages.
POINT II.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE DISTRICT COURT IS NOT

SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK IN THE CIRCUIT COURT.

-6-

This subject matter

is dealt with

at Point

II of

Appellants' Brief and in Point I of the Brief of Appellees.
Plaintiffs7 sole defense to this point is the allegation
that this issue was allegedly not raised in the lower court and is
therefore precluded from consideration on appeal.
The plaintiffs are in error in this assertion.
Pointing out the Judgment is not subject to collateral
attack, particularly in a lower court, is the defense of res
judicata or collateral estoppel looked at from a slightly different
perspective, but it is basically the same rule.
If res judicata or collateral estoppel apply, as we
believe they do, then that is the end of the matter.

Plaintiffs,

however, attempt to circumvent said doctrines by asking the Circuit
Court to go behind the District Court Judgment to find that the
issues of taxes and water assessment was in effect "reserved" by an
alleged stipulation of the parties.

The District Court Judgment

does not reserve such issue within the four corners of the
document, and the lower court cannot collaterally attack the
District Court Judgment to avoid application of the doctrines of
res judicata or collateral estoppel.

To allow another court,

particularly a lower court, to do that is to in effect nullify the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and therefore
the rule that precludes such collateral attack is a necessary and
integral part of said doctrines.

-7-

Furthermore, the Third Defense to defendants' Answer
states:
"Plaintiffs' Complaint is barred by the principles
of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and the Final
Judgment in the case of 'The Estate of Douglas B.
Covington,
by
and
through
its
Co-Personal
Representatives, Robert H. Covington and Mary C, Whetman,
Plaintiff, vs. John C. and Geraldine C. Josephson,
Defendants,' Civil No. C-89-3339, entered in this action
on or about December 18, 1991, bars this action in its
entirety."
A

fair

reading

of

that

defense

demonstrates

that

defendants are asserting that the earlier Judgment is a bar to this
action, including, but not limited to application of the doctrines
of res judicata and collateral estoppel. The said Third Defense is
framed

in two

independent

clauses.

The

first

asserts that

plaintiffs' Complaint is barred by the two enumerated principles of
law, to-wit:

res judicate and collateral estoppel, and the second

clause asserts that the final Judgment "bars this action in its
entirety."

(Even plaintiffs admit that these clauses are separate

defenses in their Memorandum found at R. 109 and 110.)

We submit

that the second clause is sufficiently broad to cover defendants'
assertion that collateral attack is improper in this case.
The rule that

issues not raised below will not be

considered on appeal is subject to numerous exceptions in any
event, and in order for it to be properly applied the reasons for
the rule must be examined.

The principal reason for the rule is

that if an issue is not raised in the court below, but rather is
raised

for the first time on appeal, the opposing party is
-8-

precluded from presenting evidence which might have refuted the
theory, had the opposing party been given notice thereof.

The

reasons for the rule are therefore primarily based upon "facts" and
not upon reasons.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error, Section 546, states in
relevant part:
"The rule requiring adherence to the theory relied
on below does not mean that the parties are limited in
the appellate court to the same reasons or arguments
advanced in the lower court upon the matter or question
in issue."
See Dewey v. Pes Moines, 173 US 193, 43 L Ed 665, 19 Sup
Ct 379, (1899) .
Summary judgment is only proper if there is no genuine
issue of material fact, and plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as
a matter of law, and "Such showing must preclude, as a matter of
law, all reasonable possibility that the loser could win if given
a trial."

See Judkins v. Toone. 27 Ut 2d 17, 492 P2d 980 (1972),

at page 983.

In so determining, all facts and inferences must be

viewed in the light most favorable to defendants.

By definition

the plaintiffs cannot have been harmed factually by any legitimate
argument of law made in this court because plaintiffs are moving
parties on the Summary Judgment which was granted below, and they
cannot claim that they have been hurt in any way by not being
allowed to introduce factual matters in the court below.

All

material facts presented by them by affidavit were countered by
defendant's Affidavit.

Furthermore, plaintiffs had the duty to
-9-

come forward with "facts" before defendants were ever required to
respond.
The defendants have clearly asserted that the prior final
Judgment

precludes

plaintiffs'

recovery,

and

defendants

are

entitled to argue any legal basis for that assertion.
At 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error, Section 548, it states:
"Questions necessarily involved in issues raised and
litigated in the trial court are open for consideration
on appeal or review, even though they were not
specifically raised below.
The degree to which the final Judgment precludes other
courts, inferior or of equal rank, from in effect overruling the
prior Judgment is necessarily a part of the assertion that the
Judgment is a bar to plaintiffs' action.
It appears clear that the Circuit Court does not have
jurisdiction to change or modify the decision of the District
Court.

In numerous cases our Supreme Court has held that the

decision of a District Court judge is not subject to modification
by another District Court judge. See Peterson v. Peterson. 530 P2d
821 (Utah 1974); Peav v. Peav. 607 P2d 841 (Utah 1980); In re
Mecham, 537 P2d 312 (Utah 1975); Johnson v.Johnson, 560 P2d 1132
(Utah 1977); and State v. Morgan 527 P2d 225 (Utah 1974).
The reasoning of those cases is even more compelling when
a Circuit Court judge attempts to in effect overrule the decision
of the District Court.

-10-

This rule is so fundamental that it would appear to be a
jurisdictional one, and of course Rule 12(h)(2), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, provides that lack of jurisdiction of the subject
matter can be raised at any time.
Likewise, 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error, Section 549,
states:
"A reviewing court may consider questions raised for
the first time on appeal if necessary to serve the ends
of substantial justice or prevent the denial of
substantial rights."
In Geis v. Continental Oil Co., 29 Ut 2nd 452, 511 P2d
725 (Utah 1973), our Supreme Court ruled that a private claim
cannot be based upon a transaction prohibited by law, although it
was apparent that that issue was not raised in the court below.
(See particularly dissenting opinion of Judge Crockett at page
456.)
For the foregoing reasons, the issue of the impropriety
of allowing a collateral attack upon the District Court Judgment is
entitled to full consideration by this court.
POINT III.

THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT, HAVING

BEEN FOUND TO HAVE BEEN PAID IN FULL BY THE DISTRICT COURT, IS
TERMINATED AND NO LONGER AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR TAXES,
WATER ASSESSMENT OR ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Plaintiffs' only defense to this point (see Point I of
appellees' brief), which appears as Point III in Josephsons'
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original brief, is that it was not raised in the lower court. This
is not so.
First of all, Josephsons deny in their Answer that any
sum is due or owing. See paragraph 6 of defendants7 Answer (R.13) .
Second,

defendants

allege

in

their

Memorandum

in

Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment that the
contract has been paid in full, and defendant, John C. Josephson,
alleges in paragraphs 2 and 4 of his Affidavit (R. 47, 48) that no
sum is due or owing.

If the contract has been paid in full, then

it follows that nothing is owing thereunder, and the discussion in
defendants' Point III is merely an explanation of the reasoning
behind that assertion, which was clearly made in the lower court.
Third, the defendants spelled out in detail their
contention that the contract was terminated and/or merged in the
earlier Judgment in their Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter
and Amend Judgment (R. 133, 137), The said document is set forth
in its entirety in the Appendix hereto.
This issue was thus clearly raised in the lower court.
Even if this were not so, the arguments set forth in
connection with Point II would be equally applicable here.
POINT IV.

AT THE VERY LEAST, FACTUAL ISSUES EXIST AS

RAISED BY THE AFFIDAVITS OF THE PARTIES.
This matter is discussed at Point IV of Josephsons'
original brief and is discussed in Points V and VI of appellees'
brief and referred to in Point I thereof.
-12-

These are disputed issues of fact. These disputed facts
appear from the Affidavits of John C. Josephson (R. 47 and 48) and
from the second Affidavit of John C. Josephson (R. 141 and 142),
which is included in teh Appendix hereto, from the Affidavit of
David K. Broadbent (R. 63), and from the Affidavit of Mary Whetman
(R. 72), all of which were before the court and were of necessity
considered by the court. These Affidavits are in conflict and raise
the following issues of fact:
A.

Was the contract paid in full?

Plaintiffs say it

was not (Affidavit of Mary Whetman R. 74), and defendant, John C.
Josephson says it was (Affidavit of John C. Josephson R. 47 and
48).

Mr. Josephson states in paragraph 1 of his Affidavit:

". .

. I fully performed all of my duties under the Uniform Real Estate
Contract."

(R. 47.)

This presents a factual issue at the very

least.
B.

Plaintiffs assert that the issue of taxes and water

assessment was by stipulation excluded from the trial.

See

Affidavit of David Broadbent (R. 63) and Affidavit of Mary Whetman
(R. 74) .

Defendant, John C. Josephson, says there was no such

stipulation entered into and no such reservation made, and he
asserts that the issue of taxes and assessments was tried.
Affidavit of John C. Josephson (R. 47 and 48 and 141 and 142).

See
We

may rest assured that if the transcript of the District Court case
disclosed any stipulation for reservation, plaintiffs would have
produced it. Since it was not produced, the presumption is that it
-13-

does not exist. At paragraph 4 of Mr. Josephson's first Affidavit
he says:
action

"...

alleged

I further state that my Answer filed in this

full performance

of the contract

by

me, and

plaintiffs' Reply denied such performance, and that issue was
directly tried by the District Court . . . " (R. 47.)
Mr. Josephson stated in his second Affidavit (R. 141 and
142) at paragraph 2:
"That I was in attendance during the whole trial in
the prior action between the parties above-named in Third
District Court, Civil No. C-89-3339. No Stipulation was
ever entered into regarding real property taxes or water
or other assessments by me or my attorney with counsel
for the Plaintiffs at any time during the course of the
trial."
Any such reservation should have been set forth in the
Judgment.

It was not because it was not the fact, and defendant,

John C. Josephson, asserts that said issue was not so reserved. At
the very least, there is an issue of fact here.
These

factual

issues were

also

fully

addressed

in

defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter and Amend (R.
134, 135 and 136).
The issue of the supposed reservation of the issue of
taxes and assessments at the trial pursuant to stipulation of the
parties is particularly important because it is obvious that the
trial court apparently felt that that alleged fact was conclusively
established,

notwithstanding

the

Josephson7s aforesaid Affidavit.

-14-

denial

contained

in

Mr.

Judge Reese has included his notes at pages 58 and 59 of
the record where he states, "Prior litigation Dist Ct did not
address issues of these taxes and water fees paid."

And, again,

"Defs attorney in prior litigation agreed to pay taxes and water
assessments-never disputed obligation (See Cummings letter)" and
also:

"Issue of taxes/water fees not litigated,"
It is entirely improper for the trial court to choose

between

two

judgment.

conflicting

affidavits

on a motion

for

summary

If it were even proper for Judge Reese to consider

matters outside of the record regarding the District Court trial,
he certainly could not do so without hearing all the evidence
bearing thereon at a factual hearing where there are conflicting
affidavits.
C.

The

other

issue

of

fact

is

that

of

the

reasonableness of attorney's fees. As noted in our original brief,
these were adjudicated without a hearing and without a finding of
reasonableness.

A

judgment

granted

without

a

hearing

is

jurisdictionally flawed and is void, and the lack of jurisdiction
can be raised at any time. Nevertheless, this issue was raised at
page 6 of defendants' said Memorandum in Support of Motion to Alter
and Amend (R. 138), which is the only place it could be raised.
Plaintiffs attempt to justify this lack of due process by
reference to Rule 4-505, Code of Judicial Administration.

It

appears clear that Rule 4-505 was intended to apply primarily to
default cases and perhaps also to cases in which the parties agree
-15-

that the matter of attorney's fees shall be handled on affidavits.
The present case is not a default case, nor did the parties agree
to handle the matter of attorney's fees on affidavit.

It is clear

that in contested cases Rule 4-505 was never intended to supersede
the requirements of the line of cases exemplified by Provo City
Corp. v. Cropper, 28 Ut 2nd 1, 497 P2d 629 (1972), which make it
clear that in contested cases involving attorney's fees the court
must take evidence and make findings as to the reasonableness of
the fees.
POINT V.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
This matter was discussed as Point V of defendants'
original brief and is not discussed in the brief of appellees, so
no reply is necessary.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Summary Judgment awarded
in favor or plaintiffs and against defendants should be reversed,
and defendants' Summary Judgment granted, or at the very least, the
matter should be remanded for trial on the said issues of fact.

GORDON A. MADSEN
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
A copy of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellants was
mailed to David K. Broadbent and Thomas M. Melton, attorneys for
the plaintiffs and appellees, at their address, 175 East 400 South,
#900, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, postage prepaid, the

day of February, 1994.

Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
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ADDENDUM
Document

Page of Record

Docket of Third Circuit Court . . . .

(attached to front
cover of Record

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment

105

Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Alter or Amend Judgment
Affidavit of John Josephson

133
141
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Page
1
JUNE 7, 1993
2:36 PM
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BREACH OF CONTRACT
Amount of Suit.:
$3500.00
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Judgment
: SJ Summary Judgment
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Court Set: ORAL ARGUMENT

Date: 02/11/93
Date:

Amt:

$10070.30

on 01/04/93 at 0200 P in room ? with RWR

No Tracking Activity.
No Accounts Payable Activity.
Transaction:
Civil File Fee
Civil File Fee

Party..: PLA
Name...:

Date:
07/07/92
05/20/93

Plaintiff

THE ESTATE OF COUGLAS B COVING
TON

Party..: DEF
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Defendant

JOSEPHSON, JOHN C

Cash-in
.00
.00

Check-in Check-out
40.00
.00
160.00
.00

Total
40.00
160.00

D O C K E T
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC
Case
: 920009436 CV Civil
Case Title:

Page
2
MONDAY
JUNE 7, 1993
2:36 PM
Filing Date: 07/07/92
Judge: Robin W. Reese

THE ESTATE OF COUGLAS B COVINGTON VS JOSEPHSON, JOHN C

Party,.: DEF
Name...:

Defendant

JOSEPHSON, GERALDINE C

Party..: ATP
Name...:

Atty for Plaintiff
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07/07/92 Case filed on 07/07/92.
Began tracking Return Date
Review on 01/04/93
921290280 Civil complaint fee
40.00
07/28/92 FILED SUMMONS ON RETURN - SERVED GERALDINE C JOSEPHSON
FILED SUMMONS ON RETURN - SERVED JOHN JOSEPHSON BY LEAVING WITH
WIFE
08/12/92 FILED ANSWER FROM DEFT'S ATTY
(ATD GORDON A MADSEN)
09/25/92 FILED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
10/22/92 FILED DEF AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED DEF MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
FILED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
12/21/92 FILED REQUEST FOR RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
12/24/92 JUDGE REESE REQUESTS ORAL ARGUMENTS HEARING BE SET FOR MONDAY
JAN 4, 1993 AT 2:00 PM.
CLERK CLEARED DATE WITH ATTY. BROADHEAD, ATP.
ARG
scheduled for 1/ 4/93 at 2:00 P in room ? with R;;R
CLERK MAILED NOTICE OF HEARING TO BOTH ATP AND ATD.
12/3 0/92 FILED REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
01/04/93 ORAL ARGUMENT
- Event No. 001
Judge: RWR
Reporter: MARLENE DAZLEY
This matter was settled on: 01/04/93
Attorney for plaintiff present Attorney for defendant present
PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMI1ARY JUDGMENT / C/O MOTION GRANTED
C/O CROSS MOTION DENIED
PLAINTIFFS ATTORNEY TO PREPARE AFFIDAVIT FOR ATTORNEY FEES
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MONDAY

THE ESTATE OF COUGLAS B COVINGTON VS JOSEPHSON, JOHN C

01/04/93 OBJECTION TO BE FILED IN 10 DAYS
01/19/93 Return Date
Review date changed to 03/15/93
01/25/93 FILED AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.
I 02/05/93 FILED MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT
I
FILED MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT
I
FILED AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN JOSEPHSON
I 02/11/93 NO OBJECTION HAVING BEEN FILED TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT,
I
JUDGE REESE SIGNS SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
I
Case judgment is Summary Judgment
AMT: 10,070.30
I
Case removed from TRACKING
I
CLERK ENTERS SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF:
I
3 370.70 PRINCIPAL
I
131.40 COSTS
I
3127.50 ATTY FEES
I
3440.70 INTEREST
I
10,070.3 0 TOTAL JUDGMENT PLUS INTEREST AT RATE OF 12% UNTIL
I
PAID.
I 02/17/93 FILED MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT.
I
FILED AFFIDAVIT.
I
FILED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
I 02/1S/93 FILED PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION
I
TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT.
I 03/25/93 FILED NOTICE TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION.
I 04/07/93 JUDGE REESE DENIES PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
I
COMPLAINT.
04/08/93 **CLERK NOTIFIED PARTIES BY MAILING COPY OF DOCKET ENTRY**
I 04/2 0/93 JUDGE REESE ENTERS ORDER THAT DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO ALTER OR
I
AMEND JUDGMENT IS DENIED.
05/20/93 FILED NOTICE OF APPEAL
FILED BOND FOR COSTS ON APPEAL
930950309 Notice of appeal fee
160.00
I 05/21/93 FILED SUPERSEDEAS BOND.
I
FILED APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND ORDER.
I
JUDGE REESE ENTERS ORDER FOR SUPERSEDEAS BOND IN THE AMOUNT OF:
I
$10,000.00
06/07/93 SENT CERTIFIED COPY OF NOTICE OF APPEAL, BOND FOR COSTS ON
APPEAL, SUPERSEDEAS BOND, APPLICATION FOR APPROVAL OF
SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND ORDER AND SUPERSEDEAS BOND TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS
End of the docket report for this case.
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Gordon A. Madsen
#2048
Attorney for Defendants
1130 West Center Street
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054
Telephone: (801) 298-6610
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT

THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B.
COVINGTON, by and through it's
Co-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and Mary
C. Wheaton,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND

Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT

vs.

Civil No. 920009436CV

JOHN C. and GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,

Judge: Robin W. Reese

Defendants.
Defendants, by

and through

their counsel of

record,

Gordon A. Madsen, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 59, URCP
submits the following in support of their Motion to Alter or Amend.
The Summary Judgment entered herein is defective on two
grounds:
which

First, Res Judicata applies, and second, the contract on

Judgment

was

granted

was

abrogated

or

subsumed

by

the

Judgment in the Third District Court action between these same
parties (Civil No. C-89-3339).
In addition
Defendants'

prior

to the cases

Memorandum

and hornbook

opposing

law cited

Plaintiffs'

Motion

in
for

Summary Judgment, the undersigned calls the court's attention to
the following:
AmJur 2d Judgments paragraph 419 states:

"When the second suit is between the same
parties as the first, and on the same cause of
action, the judgment in the former is
conclusive of the latter, not only as to every
question which was decided, but also as to
every other matter which the parties might
have litigated and had determined, within the
issues as they were made or tendered by the
pleadings, whether the same, as a matter of
fact, were or were not considered.
"As far as subsequent proceedings under a
different cause of action ar concerned, the
doctrine of res judicata is held not to apply
to issues raised in the previous case which
were not passed on by the court or jury in
deciding it.
Hence, the doctrine of res
judicata does not preclude relitigation of an
issue raised by the pleadings in the former
action, but withdrawn or withheld from the
consideration of the court or of the jury/
either by stipulation of the parties or
otherwise.
Likewise a judgment is not res
judicata as to any matters which a court
expressly refused to determine, and which it
reserved for future consideration, or which it
directed to be litigated in another forum or
in another action.
However, the mere fact
that the court omits reference to a particular
matter put in issue does not necessarily
indicate that it was not decided, so as to
preclude its judgment from operating as res
judicata with respect thereto, since the
judgment may be construed to settle all the
issues by implication.
46 AmJur 2d 588-9
(emphasis added)
As noted in our former Memorandum, the issue of Defendants'
performance under the contract was expressly plead in Defendants'
Answer and Counterclaim and expressly denied in Plaintiffs' Reply,
and

Judge

performed.

Moffat

expressly

found

that

Defendants

had

fully

Accordingly the question of payment of property taxes

and water assessments were matters "which the parties might have
litigated and had determined, within the issues as they were made
or tendered by the pleadings, whether the same, as a matter of
fact, were or were not considered."

The Ohio case of State ex rel. Brophv v. City of Lakewood, et
al. , 139 Ohio St. 633; 41 NE 2d 856 (1942) seems directly on point.
The original suit was a Mandamus action seeking to compel the
Defendant municipality to require it to restore a certain sum to
the water fund from the general fund.

The second action sought to

amend the Judgment of the first action to add interest to the sum
ordered restored.

The Ohio Supreme Court held:

"The same issue here presented was before
this court in the case of the City of Lakewood
v. Rees, supra. The jurisdiction of the court
extended to interest on the fund, if any was
due, as it did to the status of the fund
itself.
If any interest was recoverable it
was due and owing up to the time of the decree
of this court. That case, which was an action
in remr is res judicata not only as to all
issues decided/ but as to all issues which the
court might have decided and as to all persons
having an interest in the subject matter.
There was no decree for interest and that
determination was final." (emphasis added)
It is to be noted that the action at bar is one "in rem"
relating to real property.

The taxes and water assessments due, if

any, were due "up to the time of the [judgment] decree" of the
Third District Court, and cannot be said to have accrued after that
time, as counsel for Plaintiffs argued.

They were paid after the

judgment, but the cause of action had ripened prior thereto, and
could

have

been

decided

in that

action,

and were

not.

Res

Judicata.
Counsel for Plaintiffs argued in this matter by his Reply
Brief with supporting Affidavits that res judicata does not apply
because there was what amounts (by his estimation) to a Stipulation
exempting or removing the issue of taxes and water assessments from
consideration by the District Court.

The Affidavit claiming the

/ ?

/

existence of such "stipulation" was not timely filed herein and was
objected to by the undersigned because we didn't have opportunity
to respond thereto.

The Affidavit of John Josephson, attached

hereto, categorically denies that any such Stipulation was entered
into during the trial in District Court, if Plaintiffs' untimely
Affidavits are to be considered, then the attached Affidavit must
also be considered.

The Affidavits, opposing each other, thus at

the very least, create a material issue of fact which precludes
Summary Judgment for Plaintiff herein.
Plaintiff's counsel also attached to their Affidavits a letter
from Robert C. Cummings, Defendants' attorney in the District Court
action, dated after the Judgment, which Plaintiffs' counsel claimed
was evidence of the supposed "stipulation."

It is no such thing.

On reading it again, the court will conclude that at best, it is an
acknowledgement

that a claim for taxes has been received, and

forwarded to his clients, who are out of town, with a statement
that a response will be forthcoming upon their return.
more.

Nothing

No reference to any supposed stipulation, and the document

could hardly be a new contract giving rise to Plaintiffs' claims.
That document could not possibly be construed to be a sufficient
writing to escape the Statute of Frauds requirements relating to
transactions involving interests in real property.
The second reason for Altering or Amending the Judgment by
vacating the same is that the original action was one seeking to
Quiet Title, an action in rem.
section 13:

Our statute (78-40) provides at

"...The judgment shall be conclusive against all the

persons named in the summons and complaint who have been served and

against all such unknown persons as stated in the complaint and
summons

who

have been

served

by publication."

In short

the

Judgment of the court subsumes and abrogates all interests of
claimants whether
claims, etc.

founded

in contract, deed, lien or

inchoate

Had a deed been given in fulfillment of the fully

performed contract, the contract would be deemed merged into the
deed.

The doctrine of "merger" that applies to deeds and contracts

(earnest money or otherwise) applies here because the District
Court's Judgment took the place of a deed.
The doctrine of merger was relied on by Plaintiff's counsel in
the prior District Court action, and is, therefore familiar to him.
We quote from his brief filed in the District Court action:
"2.

All

Contemporaneous

Agreements

are

Merged

Into the Warranty Deed.
"Utah Courts recognize the doctrine of merger.
Knight, 716 P 2d 790 (Utah 1986).
168 (Utah

Secor v.

In Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P 2d

1977), the court explained the doctrine:
'The doctrine of merger, which this Court
recognizes, is applicable when the acts to be
performed by the seller in a contract relate
only to the delivery of title to the buyei:.
Execution and delivery of a deed by
the
seller
then
usually
constitutes
full
performance on his part, and acceptance of the
deed by the buyer manifests his acceptance of
that performance even though the estate
conveyed may differ from that promised in the
antecedent agreement.
Therefore, in such a
case, the deed is the final agreement and all
prior terms, whether written or verbal, are
extinguished and unenforceable.Ml (emphasis
added)

Since the Judgment in the District Court conveyed title to
Defendants and was the final disposition of the rights of the

parties under the contract there disputed, particularly where the
court made an express finding of full performance by Defendants,
constitutes a merger and "final agreement" and the prior contract
is

"extinguished

and unenforceable."

Accordingly

there is no

contract surviving the District Court Judgment on which Plaintiffs
may in this action base a claim for taxes, water assessments.

And

obviously, as well, there is no surviving contract upon which
Plaintiffs can maintain a claim for attorneys fees.
Although awarding an attorney's fee upwards of $3,000.00 for
collection of upwards of $3,000.00 is totally unreasonable, we are
not obliged to consider reasonableness, herein because there is no
basis in contract or law herein to award attorneys fees.
The merger doctrine is analogous to the holding regarding
recision found in BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, 586 P 2d 456 (Utah,
1978).

In that action, the Defendants were allowed to rescind a

contract for the purchase of a ranch, and in their cross-appeal
claimed that the court below erred in not granting them attorneys
fees as provided in the contract.

Justice Hall speaking for the

court said:
"Finally, Pattersons contend that the
trial court erred in denying their request for
attorney fees.
This was not error.
Their
claim for attorney fees is based upon a
provision in the contract of sale. By asking
for recision of the contract, they disaffirmed
it in its entirety.
They may not avoid the
contract and, at the same time, claim the
benefit of the provision for attorney fees."
(p. 458)
More directly on point under the "merger" doctrine is the case
of Kelsey v. Hansen, 18 Utah 2d 226; 419 P 2d 198 (Utah 1966).
that action a certain Hansen

In

(a real estate broker) and Boyer

/

(Hansen's sales agent) jointly signed an Earnest Money Agreement to
buy a fourplex from Plaintiff Kelsey.

The agreement provided that

the buyers would pay for certain "extras"--drapes, etc.
Deed was executed, Hansen was the sole Grantee.
made in the Deed about the "extras."
Hansen

under

"extras."

the

Earnest

Money

When the

No mention was

Kelsey then sued Boyer and

Agreement

for

payment

of

the

The court held:
"The theory is that the deed to Hansen
was not decisive of Boyer's commitment to buy
and pay extras. We think it was, and that a
merger resulted, especially since the Earnest
Money Receipt also said that 'it is further
agreed that execution of the final contract
shall abrogate this Earnest Money Receipt.'
We have difficulty in seeing why a warranty
deed to Hansen should not abrogate the
preliminary,
loosely
drawn
and
almost
incoherent Earnest Money Receipt, and thus
merge what really amounted only to signed
notes of a contemplated future transaction for
a deed, voluntarily executed, subject to and
actually recorded under conceded recording
procedures,
which
was
accomplished
and
sanctioned by legislative authority."

It follows, by analogy, that whatever claims were or could
have been made in Third District Court were conclusively disposed
of, merged and abrogated by the Judgment in that action, and there
is no contract surviving that action left to Plaintiffs on which
they can proceed in this court.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons the Court should Alter and Amend the
Summary Judgment heretofore entered herein, by vacating the same
and granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, or at the
most setting a trial to determine the narrow and sole issue of

whether in fact a stipulation occurred in District Court that would
provide a basis to take this action out from under the doctrines of
merger and res judicata.
Dated this 3

clay of February, 1993.
Respectfully submitted,
/

^ ^

"^

~tj~&*i
Madsen, Attorney for
fendants
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion to
David K. Broadbent and Thomas M. Melton, attorneys for Plaintiffs,
at their address, City Centre I, Suite 900, 175 East Fourth South,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this

3rd day of February, 1993.

Gordon A. Madsen
#2048
Attorney for Defendants
1130 West Center Street
North Salt Lake, Utah 84054
Telephone: (801) 298-6610
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT

THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS B.
COVINGTON, by and through it's
Co-Personal Representatives,
Robert H. Covington and Mary
C. Wheaton,

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN JOSEPHSON

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 920009436CV
Judge: Robin W. Reese

JOHN C. and GERALDINE C.
JOSEPHSON,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF DAVIS

)
)

ss.

JOHN C. JOSEPHSON, upon his oath deposes and says:
1.

That I am one of the Defendants named in the above-

entitled action, and aver the facts set out below from my own
direct knowledge.
2.

That I was in attendance during the whole trial in

the prior action between the parties above-named in Third District
Court, Civil No. C-89-3339.

No Stipulation was ever entered into

regarding real property taxes or water or other assessments by me
or my attorney with counsel for the Plaintiffs at any time during
the course of the trial.

K\
AFFIANT
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public this
J&2-day of January, 1993.

/

sL

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at:
My (

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Affidavit
t <;.) D a v i (::1 K

B 2: o a d b e n t
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T3:iQUI a ^. Ml

M e ] t:o n

a 1: I: o r 11 e y s

f < D 11

Plaintiffs, at: thei r address, City Centre I, Suite 900,- 175 East
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 3> tl* day of *!^5^
, 1992.
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